Segerstrom (1998) shows that it is optimal to tax R&D if the size of innovation is su¢ciently large but subsidize it otherwise. That is, research projects which lead to "radical" technological breakthroughs should be taxed. This normative result crucially depends on a unit elasticity of substitution between any two variety goods in consumers utility function. This note generalizes his model, allowing the elasticity of substitution to be equal to or larger than one. Results are striking: Segerstrom's normative result is not robust. The optimal policy for "radical" innovation is always subsidies. Furthermore, under certain conditions it is optimal to subsidize R&D, irrespective of the size of innovation. 
In this Review, Segerstrom (1998) modi…es Grossman and Helpman's (1991) R&D-based growth model (hereafter GH) in order to reconcile it with Jones's (1995a) empirical evidence which shows no "scale e¤ects" in technological advance. An important result is that it is optimal to tax R&D if the size of innovation is su¢ciently large but subsidize it otherwise. It would mean that research projects which lead to "radical" technological breakthroughs should be taxed. This normative result is obtained, assuming a unit elasticity of substitution between any two variety goods in consumers utility function.
In this note, we argue that this normative result is not robust and crucially depends on a unit elasticity of substitution assumed. To establish this striking result, we generalize Segerstrom's model, allowing the elasticity of substitution to be equal to or larger than one. That is, Segerstrom's Cobb-Douglas with perfect substitutes (CDS) preferences are generalized to the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (Dixit-Stiglitz type) with perfect substitutes (CESS) preferences. 1 We show that the optimal policy for "radical" innovation (with a large size of innovation) is always subsidies. Furthermore, under certain conditions it is globally optimal to subsidize R&D, irrespective of the size of innovation. These results arise essentially because …rms' pricing decisions, and hence pro…t incentives for R&D, markedly di¤er depending on whether the CESS or CDS preferences are assumed.
We believe that these results are particularly important, since welfare analysis forms the theoretical basis for public policy towards R&D and economic growth.
To sharpen the results, we …rst consider the case where the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is strictly larger than one. This will facilitate the later discussion of the more general model which incorporates Segerstrom's model as a special case. 1 The CDS preferences were …rst introduced by Segerstrom, et al. (1990) .
1 The CESS Preferences
Consumers and Workers
We maintain Segerstrom's notations and assumptions unless otherwise stated. The number of workers is given by L (t) = L 0 e nt where L 0 denotes the population at t = 0 (L 0 = 1 in Segerstrom). The utility per person takes the form of the CESS preferences:
where the dependence of j on ! in¸j ! is made explicit. The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is 1= (1 ¡ ®) ; and the CDS preferences used in Segerstrom (and GH) is obtained when ® = 0:
From (1), the demand function for the product with the lowest quality-adjusted price in industry ! is given by (see below for more detail)
and other goods in the same industry are not consumed. Given (2), the intertemporal utility maximization yields _ c (t) =c (t) = r (t) ¡ ½; as in Segerstrom.
Product Markets
Substituting (2) into (1) yields the indirect utility function per person:
c (t) : Clearly, d (j; !; t) is purchased (i.e. gives a higher utility) if and only if it has the lowest quality-adjusted price, i.e. p (j; !; t) =¸j
or p (j; !; t) ·¸where p (j ¡ 1; !; t) = 1 due to Bertrand competition. Thus, as the demand function (2) has the price elasticity of
a top-quality …rm sets p (j; !; t) = 1=® for 1=® <¸or a limit price p (j; !; t) =¸otherwise, i.e.
p (j; !; t) = 1 µ´8
1=® for 1=® <¸(drastic innovation)
for 1=®¸¸(non-drastic innovation).
Innovation is drastic for 1=® <¸in the sense that …rms' price decisions are not constrained by potential competition from previous incumbent (lower-quality goods) producers. In Segerstrom, innovation is always non-drastic, since ® = 0: This di¤erence has important implications for welfare analysis below. The quality leader earns
where
is equivalent to the average quality across industries. 2 
R&D Races
Any R&D …rm i that uses`i workers in industry ! will succeed in generating the (j + 1)th innovation with instantaneous probability of This probability depends on ® (through "), a consumer utility parameter. This is needed to ensure constant long-run growth of utility. In addition, the homothetic utility function (1) can be interpreted as a production function with u (t) and d (j; !; t) denoting …nal and intermediate products (see Grossman and Helpman (1991b, p.47) for more detail). What this assumption really implies is that production technology is somehow related to innovation technology. In fact, this assumption is used in Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995, p249-250).
If ® = " = 0; it is reduced to A`i; which is essentially equivalent to the R&D technology used by GH. Segerstrom modi…es this into A`i=X (!; t) where X (!; t) is his "di¢culty index" of R&D, and assumes that X (:) grows at a rate proportional to R&D intensity in industry !. This assumption re ‡ects the rational behavior of researchers in the following sense. Consider R&D targeting at a given quality level. Researchers start o¤ pursuing the most promising projects. If they fail, X (:) rises and they try less promising projects with a higher X (:). In this sense, increasing R&D di¢culty arises from a series of research failures.
In this paper, we highlight another source of increasing R&D di¢culty, namely research successes. Consider the production of silicon chips, which are created by printing circuit patterns on wafers of silicon. As more and more transistors are condensed in a single chip (now well in excess of ten million), the creation of the next-generation chip becomes more and more di¢cult, and the conventional method is said to hit a "wall", at which circuit patterns begin to blur. This type of R&D di¢culty arises only if research is successful. This is captured by our di¢culty index¸" (j ! +1) : If R&D succeeds, this index rises by a factor¸" and the probability of success in the subsequent R&D falls with other things being equal. In a later section, we combine these two sources of R&D di¢culty.
Another important feature of (5), which is absent in Segerstrom, is the positive knowledge spillover e¤ect across industries. This is represented by Q (t) Jones's (1995b) idea that R&D technology exhibits diminishing returns to knowledge accumulation. Such knowledge spillover, ceteris paribus, raises the probability of research success during an R&D race (during which¸"
is …xed), as other industries experience R&D successes. In Segerstrom, in contrast, the probability of success tends to fall, since X (!; t) continuously rises.
Let v (j + 1; !; t) denote the expected discounted pro…ts for inventing the (j + 1)th invention in industry !: Since an R&D …rm maximizes v (j + 1; !; t)
free entry leads to
whenever`i > 0: This condition makes entrepreneurs indi¤erent to any R&D projects.
The value of innovation is de…ned by the "no-arbitrage" condition ¼ (j; !; t) =v (j; !; t)+ _ v (j; !; t) =v (j; !; t) = r (t) + I (j + 1; !; t) where
Note that (i) equation (6) implies _ v (j; !; t) =v (j; !; t) = ¡Á _ Q (t) =Q (t) for all j and !;
since¸"
is …xed from the viewpoint of entrepreneurs and investors, and (ii) equations (4) and (6) give
for all j and !:
Therefore, the above no-arbitrage condition implies I (j + 1; !; t) = I (t) for all j and !;
so that it can be re-expressed as
which holds for all j and !:
The Labor Market and Q (t)
The total employment of research workers is derived from (7):
; as I (j; !; t) = I (t) : Employment in the manufacturing sector is given by 4 Given I (j; !; t) = I, (7) implies that industries which have in the past experienced more innovations devote relatively more resources to R&D. Thus, although the patent rate is the same across industries, R&D employment levels change stochastically around the average over time.
Thus, the labor full-employment requires
A key variable in this model is Q (t). Note that quality improvement¸"
occurs with the arrival rate of I (j; !; t) : Therefore, the law of large numbers implies
where the second equality uses (7) (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, p.260).
Balanced Growth Equilibrium
First de…ne x (t) = Q (t) 1¡Á =L (t) : Equations (8) and (9) imply that x (t) must be constant in steady sate, which in turn implies
Besides, (1) is reduced to u (t) = µcQ (t) 1=" : (10) and (11) imply that the utility grows at
Segerstrom reports I = n=¹ where ¹ is a parameter, and a higher ¹ accelerates an increase in his R&D di¢culty index. In (11), ¹ is replaced with technology parameters,
. Another interesting di¤erence lies in utility growth, which is increasing in¸in Segerstrom (see equation (19) of his paper) but is independent of¸in our model (equation (12)). Segerstrom mentions a possible extension of endogenizing utility growth through endogenizing¸. This version of our model suggests that such an extension endogenizes the rate of technical progress but not utility growth.
Equilibrium conditions in steady-state ( _ c = _ x = 0) are obtained from (8) and (9):
A …gure depicting these two conditions is essentially identical to Figure 3 of Segerstrom. 5 Note that the equilibrium exists if and only if 1 > Á > 0; i.e. diminishing returns to knowledge accumulation is a key to eliminating scale e¤ects. 6 This is the assumption used by Jones's (1995b) variety model. In this sense, our model shows a sharp parallel between R&D-based growth models with quality and variety innovations.
Solving (13) and (14) yields the share of R&D workers k´L I (t) =L (t) = 1 ¡ µc : One can easily establish that equilibrium is saddle-path stable. 6 If n = 0 and Á = 1; the model becomes a generalized version of GH with scale e¤ects. Normative implications of this model quite di¤er from those of GH. This problem is dealt with somewhere else.
Social Optimum
Next we compare the market and socially optimal outcomes. Appendix shows that (i) the optimal R&D intensity is the same as (11), and (ii) the optimal share of R&D workers is
Somewhat surprisingly, k S is independent of the size of an innovation¸: Figure 1 depicts (15) In Segerstrom, it is optimal to subsidize R&D for a small¸and to tax it for a largȩ . This result is modi…ed in our extended model.
Further Generalization: 1 > ®¸0
The model developed above applies to 1 > ® > 0; while Segerstrom examines ® = 0:
For a general model which applies to 1 > ®¸0; the Poisson arrival rate (5) is modi…ed as A`i X(!;t)¸"
The denominator incorporates Segerstrom's R&D di¢culty index X (!; t) based on research failures as well as ours based on research successes. As in Segerstrom, we assume _ X (!; t) =X (!; t) = ¹I (j + 1; !; t) ; ¹ > 0. Following each step explained in the previous section with X (!; 0) = X 0 and
one can verify that there exists symmetric steady state in the market economy where I (j; !; t) = I (t) and Turning to the social optimum, Appendix con…rms that (i) the optimal R&D intensity is given by (17), and (ii) the optimal share of R&D workers is
It is monotonically increasing in¸at a decreasing rate. Note that (17)»(19) collapse to either (i) equations (11), (15) First we establish that Segerstrom's result (R&D subsidy for a small¸and tax for a large¸) cannot be obtained, except for ® = 0: It is su¢cient to prove that the optimal policy for an arbitrarily large¸is R&D subsidies. It is established by noting
Comparison of k and k S indicates several possibilities in general. To avoid taxonomic analysis, we concentrate on a few interesting cases. First note that
This means that for ¹ < 1; k S increases faster than k at the vicinity of¸= 1. In Figure   2 , this case is represented by the k curves labelled k 1 and k 2 . Due to (20), these two curves can be located entirely below the k S curve, implying that R&D subsidy is globally optimal.
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Next consider the reverse case of ¹ > 1: The relevant k curve is denoted by k 3 in Figure 2 . The k curve is now steeper than the k
for a small¸: As¸gets larger, we eventually reach the range where k (¸) < k S (¸) due to (20). Therefore, it is optimal to tax R&D for a small¸but subsidize it for a large¸:
This is the reverse of Segerstrom's result. Intuitions for the results again lie in the relative strength of positive and negative externalities mentioned in the previous section.
Conclusion
Generalizing Segerstrom's model with the CESS preferences, we have shown that his normative results are not robust. A general conclusion is that the positive externalities always exceed the negative ones for a su¢ciently large¸; which is interpreted as "radical" technological innovation. It was also shown that under certain conditions, R&D subsidies 7 If k (¸) exceeds k S (¸) for an intermediate range of¸; it is optimal to tax R&D in that range.
are the optimal policy irrespective of¸: We believe that these results represent a signi…cant improvement of our understanding of the e¢ciency nature of technological progress in a growing economy.
Appendix: Social Optimum
This appendix considers the social optimum for 1 > ®¸0 and ¹¸0: The model in Section 1 is a special case where 1 > ® > 0 and ¹ = 0: We …rst examine the problem of the static labor allocation across manufacturing industries, taking total workers in manufacturing as constant. Dropping the time argument, the social planner solves max d(j;!) log u
where u is given in (1). With ± denoting the Lagrangian multiplier, the …rst-order conditions are given by L±
which gives rise to d (j; ! 0 ) = Now de…ne © (t) = R t 0 I (¿ ) d¿ ; so that Q (t) = e (¸"¡1)©(t) from (10). Furthermore, we can write x (t) = X (t) Q (t) 1¡Á =L (t) = X 0 e ¹©(t) e (1¡Á)(¸"¡1)©(t) =L 0 e nt ; which leads to © (t) = ln x(t)¡ln X 0 =L 0 +nt ¹+(1¡Á)(¸"¡1)
: Using these, the dynamic optimization problem that the social planner solves is 
where B = ¹+(1 ¡ Á) (¸" ¡ 1) : Dropping constant terms, the Hamiltonian is ln
ln x where » is a costate variable. By Pontryagin's maximum principle,
In steady state, (23) implies _ » = _ x = 0. This in turn leads to I = n=B which is equivalent to (11) or (17). Using these results and (23), (24) becomes » =¸" ¡1 "B½x : Substituting this into (23) and using I = n=B; we can rewrite k S = 1 ¡ z as (16) or (19). The share of R&D workers for 1 > ®¸0 (k 1 is for ¹ < 1 and ª > ¢; k 2 is for ¹ < 1 and ª < ¢; and k 3 is for ¹ > 1 and ª < ¢):
